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Abstract
Quantitative social science is not only about regression analysis or, in general, data in-
ference. Computer simulations of social mechanisms have an over 60 years long his-
tory. They have been used for many different purposes—to test scenarios, to test the 
consistency of descriptive theories (proof-of-concept models), to explore emergent phe-
nomena, for forecasting, etc. In this essay, we sketch these historical developments, the 
role of mechanistic models in the social sciences and the influences from the natural 
and formal sciences. We argue that mechanistic computational models form a natural 
common ground for social and natural sciences, and look forward to possible future 
information flow across the social-natural divide.
Background
In mainstream empirical social science, a result of a study often consists of two conclu-
sions. First, that there is a statistically significant correlation between a variable de-
scribing a social phenomenon and a variable thought to explain it. Second, that the 
correlations with other, more basic, or trivial, variables (called control, or confounding, 
variables) are weaker. There has been a trend in recent years to criticize this approach 
for putting too little emphasis on the mechanisms behind the correlations [Woodward 
2014, Salmon 1998, Hedström Ylikoski 2010]. It is often argued that regression analysis 
(and the linear, additive models they assume) cannot serve as causal explanations of 
an open system such as usually studied in social science. A main reason is that, in an 
empirical study, there is no way of isolating all conceivable mechanisms [Sayer 2000]. 
Sometimes authors point to natural science as a role model in the quest for mechanistic 
models. This is somewhat ironical, since many natural sciences, most notably physics, 
traditionally put more emphasis on the unification of theories and the reduction of hy-
potheses [Woodward 2014]. In other words, striving to show that two theories could 
be more simply described as different aspects of a single, unified theory. Rather than 
being imported from natural or formal sciences, mechanistic modeling has evolved in 
parallel. Maybe the most clean-cut forms of mechanistic models are those used in com-
puter simulations. Their past, present and future, and the flow of information across 
disciplines regarding them, are the themes of this paper. Before proceeding, other au-
thors would probably spend considerable amounts of ink to define and discuss central 
concepts—in our case “mechanism” and “causal”. We think their everyday usage in both 
natural and social sciences is sufficiently precise for our purpose and recommend Hed-
ström and Ylikoski [2010] to readers with a special interest of details.
In practice, establishing the mechanisms behind a social phenomenon takes much 
more than simulating a model. Mechanistic models can serve several different purposes 
en route to establishing a mechanistic explanation. We will make a distinction of proof-
of-concept modeling, discovery of hypotheses and scenario testing (described in detail be-
low). There are of course other ways, perhaps also better, to characterize mechanistic 
models. These categories are not strict either—they could be overlapping with regard 
to a specific model. Nevertheless, we think they serve a point in our discussion and that 
they are fairly well defined.
The idea of proof-of-concept modeling is to test the consistency of a verbal descrip-
tion, or cartoon diagram, of a phenomenon [Servedio & al. 2014]. It is in general hard 
to make an accurate verbal explanation, especially if it involves connecting different 
levels of abstraction, such as going from a microscopic to a macroscopic description. A 
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common mistake is to neglect implicit assumptions, some that may even be the conven-
tion of a field. With the support of such proof-of-concept models, a verbal argument be-
comes much stronger. Then one has at least firmly established that the constituents of 
the theory are sufficient to explain the phenomenon. The individual-based simulations 
of the Anasazi people (inhabiting parts of the American West millennia ago) by Joshua 
Epstein, Robert Axtell and colleagues [Epstein Axtell 1996] are blueprints of proof-of-
concept modeling. In these simulations, the authors combined a multitude of condi-
tions along with anthropological theories to show that they could generate outcomes 
similar to the archaeological records.
The most common use of mechanistic models is our second category—to explore 
the possible outcomes of a certain situation, and to generate hypotheses. We will see 
many examples of that in our essay. As a first example, consider Robert Axelrod’s com-
puter tournaments to find optimal strategies for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma [Axel-
rod 1984]. The prisoner’s dilemma captures a situation where an individual can choose 
whether or not to cooperate with another. If one knows that the encounter is the last 
one, the rational choice is always not to cooperate. However, if the situation could be 
repeated an unknown number of times, then it might be better to cooperate. To figure 
out the way too cope with this situation, Axelrod invited researchers to submit strate-
gies to a round-robin tournament. The winning strategy (“tit-for-tat”) was to start co-
operating and then do whatever your opponent did the previous step. From this result, 
Axelrod could make the hypothesis that a tit-for-tat-like behavior is common among 
both people and animals, either because they often face a prisoner’s dilemma or at that 
such situations, once you face them, tend to be important.
Mechanistic models forecasting social systems are less frequent than our previous 
two classes. One reason is probably that forecasting open systems is difficult (some-
times probably even impossible) [Sayer 2000]; another that non-mechanistic methods 
(machine learning, statistical models, etc.) are better for this purpose. A model without 
any predictive power whatsoever is, of course, not a model at all, and under some condi-
tions all mechanistic models can be used in forecasting, or (perhaps more accurately) 
scenario testing. One celebrated example is the “World3” simulation popularized by the 
Club of Rome 1972 book The Limits to Growth [Meadows & al. 1972] where an exponen-
tially growing artificial population faced a world of limited resources. Maybe a sign of 
the time, since several papers from the early 1970s called for “whole Earth simulations” 
[Patterson 1970, Rau 1970]. Echoes of this movement were heard recently with the pro-
posal of a “Living Earth Simulator” [Paolucci & al. 2012].
In this essay, we will explore mechanistic models as scientific explanations in the 
social sciences. We will give an overview of the development of computer simulations 
of mechanistic models (primarily in the social sciences, but also mentioning relevant 
developments in the natural sciences), and finally discuss if and how mechanistic mod-
els can be a common ground for cross-disciplinary research between the natural and 
social sciences. We do not address data-driven science in the interface of the natural 
or social, nor do we try to give a comprehensive survey of mechanistic models in the 
social sciences. We address anyone interested in using simulation methods familiar to 
theoretical natural scientists to advance the social sciences.
Influence from the natural and formal sciences
As we will see below, the development and use of computer simulations to understand 
social mechanisms has happened on quite equal terms as in the natural and formal sci-
ences. It will, however, be helpful for the subsequent discussion to sketch the important 
developments of computer simulations as mechanistic models in the natural sciences. 
This is of course a topic that would need several book volumes for a comprehensive cov-
erage—we will just mention what we regard the most important breakthroughs.
The military origins
Just like in social science, simulation in natural science has many of its roots in the mili-
tary from the time around the Second World War. The second major project running on 
the first programmable computer, ENIAC, started April 1947. The topic, the flow of neu-
trons in an incipient explosion of a thermonuclear weapon [Haigh & al. 2014], is perhaps 
of little interest today, but the basic method has never ran out of fashion—it was the first 
computer program using (pseudo) random numbers, and hence an ancestor of most 
modern computer simulations. Exactly who invented this method, codenamed Monte 2.
Carlo, is somewhat obscure, but it is clear it came out of the development of the hydro-
gen bomb right after the war. The participants came from the (then recently finished) 
Manhattan project. Nicholas Metropolis, Stanislaw Ulam and John von Neumann are 
perhaps most well known, but also Klara von Neumann, John’s wife [Haigh & al. 2014]. It 
was not only the first program to use random numbers, it was also the first modern pro-
gram in the sense that it had function calls, and had to be fed into the computer along 
with the input. As a curiosity, the random number generator in this program worked by 
squaring eight-digit numbers and using the mid eight digits as output and seed to the 
next iteration. Far from having the complexity of modern pseudo random number gen-
erator (read Mersenne Twister [Matsumoto Nishimura 1998]), it gives random numbers 
of (at least in the authors’ opinion) surprisingly good statistical quality.
The first Monte Carlo simulation was not an outright success as a contribution to 
the nuclear weapons program. Nevertheless, the idea of using random numbers in sim-
ulations has not fallen out of fashion ever since, and the Monte Carlo method (nowa-
days referring to any computational model based on random numbers) has become a 
mainstay of numerical methods. Another very significant step for the natural scienc-
es, especially chemistry and statistical physics, by the Los Alamos group was the Me-
tropolis–Hastings algorithm—a method to sample configurations of particles, atoms 
or molecules according to the Boltzmann distribution (connecting the probability of a 
configuration and its energy). The radical invention was to choose configurations with 
a probability proportional to the Boltzmann distribution and weighting them equally, 
rather than choosing configurations randomly and weighing them by the probability 
given by the Boltzmann distribution [Metropolis & al. 1953]. Hastings name was added 
to credit his extension of the algorithm to general distributions [Hastings 1970]. Today, 
this algorithm is an indispensible simulation technique to generate the probability dis-
tributions of the state of a system both in natural and social sciences (usually called 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo, MCMC).
The Monte Carlo project and the MCMC method did not immediately lead to funda-
mental advances in science itself. Deterministic computational methods, on the other 
hand, did, and (not surprisingly) post-Manhattan-project researchers were involved. 
Enrico Fermi, John Pasta and Stanislaw Ulam (and, like the Monte Carlo project, with 
undercredited help by a female researcher, Mary Tsingou [Dauxois 2008]) studied vibra-
tions of a one-dimensional string with non-linear corrections to Hooke’s law (that states 
that the force needed to extend a spring a certain distance is proportional to the dis-
tance). They expected to see the nonlinearity transferring energy from one vibrational 
mode (like the periodic solution of the linear problem) to all other modes (i.e. thermal 
fluctuations) according to the equipartition theorem [Landau Lifshitz 1980]. Instead of 
such a “thermalization” process, they observed the transition to a complex, quasi-peri-
odic state [Fermi & al. 1955] that never lost its memory of the initial condition. The FPU 
paradox was the starting point of a scientific theme called “nonlinear science” that also, 
as we will see, has left a lasting imprint on social science.
Complexity theory
Nonlinear science has a strong overlap with chaos theory, another set of ideas from 
natural sciences that influenced social science. Chaos is summarized in the vernacular 
by the “butterfly effect”—a small change (the flapping of a butterfly’s wings) could lead 
to a big difference (a storm) later. One important early contribution came from Edward 
Lorentz’s computational solutions of equations describing atmospheric convection. He 
observed that a small change in the initial condition could send the equations off into 
completely different trajectories [Lorentz 1963]. Just like for the FPU paradox, the role of 
the computational method in chaos theory has largely been to discover hypotheses that 
later have been corroborated by analytical studies. This line of research has not been 
directly aimed at discovering new mechanisms; still, ideas and concepts from chaos 
theory have also reached social sciences [Kiel Elliott 1996].
Another natural science development largely fueled by computer simulations, which 
has influenced social sciences, is that of fractals. Fractals are mathematical objects that 
embody self-similarity—a river can branch into contributaries, that branch into smaller 
contributaries, and so on, until the biggest rivers are reduced to the tiniest creeks [Man-
delbrot 1983]. At all scales, the branching looks the same. Fractals provide an analysis 
tool—the fractal dimension—that can characterize self-similar objects. There are many 
socioeconomic systems that are self-similar—financial time series [Mantegna Stanley 3.
1999], the movement of people [Brockmann & al. 2006], the fluctuations in the size of 
organizations [Mondani & al. 2014], etc. Quite frequently, however, authors have not ac-
companied their measurement of a fractal dimension with a mechanistic explanation of 
it, which is perhaps why fractals have fallen out of fashion lately.
Fractals are closely related to power-law probability distributions, i.e. the probabili-
ty of an observable x being proportional to x–a, a > 0. Power-laws are the only self-similar 
(or “scale-free”) real-to-real functions in the sense that, if e.g. the wealth distribution of 
a population is a power law, then a statement like “there are twice as many people with 
a wealth of 10x than 15x” is true, no matter if x is dollars, euros, yen or kronor [Newman 
2005]. The theories for such power-law phenomena date back to Pareto’s lectures on 
economics published 1896 [Pareto 1896]. Fractals and power-laws are also connected to 
phase transitions in physics—an idea popularized in Hermann Haken’s book Synergetics 
[Haken 1982].
Next step in our discussion is the studies of artificial life. The central question in 
this line of research is to mechanistically recreate the fundamental properties of a liv-
ing system, including self-replication, adaptability, robustness and evolution [Langton 
1998]. The origins of artificial life can be traced to John von Neumann’s self-replicating 
cellular automata. These are configurations of discrete variables confined to an under-
lying square grid that, following a distinct set of rules, can reproduce, live and die [von 
Neumann 1966]. The field of artificial life later developed in different directions, both 
toward the more abstract study of cellular automata and to more biology-related ques-
tions [Langton 1998]. It is also strongly linked to the study of adaptive systems (systems 
able to respond to changes in the environment) [Miller Page 2009] and has a few re-
curring ideas that also are related to social phenomena. The first idea is that simple 
rules can create complex behavior. The best-known model illustrating this is perhaps 
Conway’s game of life. This is a cellular automaton with the same objectives as that of 
von Neuman, but with fewer and simpler rules [Langton 1998]. The second idea (maybe 
not discovered by the field of artificial life, but at least popularized) is that of emergence. 
This refers to the properties of a system, as a whole, coming from the interaction of a 
large number of individual subunits. A textbook example is that of murmurations of 
birds (flocks of hundreds of thousands of e.g. starlings). These can exhibit an undulating 
motion, fluctuating in density, that in no way could be anticipated from the movement 
of an individual. Another feature of emergence, exemplified by bird flocks, is that of de-
centralization—there is no leader bird. These topics are common to many disciplines of 
social science (emergence is similar to the micro-to-macro-transition in sociology and 
economics). These theories have spawned its own modeling paradigm—agent based 
models [Šalamon 2011, Epstein 2006, Carley Wallace 2001, Hedström Manzo 2015]—that 
is similar to what was simply called “simulation” in early computational social science. 
One first sets up rules for how units (agents) interact with each other and their sur-
roundings. Then one simulates many of them together (typically on a two-dimensional 
grid) and let them interact. We note that the concept of emergence has also been influ-
ential to cognitive, and subsequently behavioral, science. The idea of cognitive process-
es being emergent properties of neural networks—connectionism [Dawson 2008]—is 
nowadays fundamental to our understanding of computational processes in nature 
[Flake 1998].
In the 1980’s, artificial life, adaptive systems, fractals and chaos where grouped to-
gether under the umbrella term complexity science [Mitchell 2011]. This was in many 
ways a social movement gathering researchers of quite marginalized research topics 
(the Santa Fe Institute, and some similar centers, acted as hubs for this development). 
Many of the themes within complexity science could probably just as well be catego-
rized as mutually independent fields. This is perhaps best illustrated in that there is no 
commonly accepted definition of “complexity”. Instead, there are a number of common, 
occasionally (but not always) connected, themes (like the above-mentioned, emer-
gence, decentralized organization, fractals, chaos, etc.) that together defines the field. 
On the other hand, there is a common goal among complexity scientists to find general, 
organizational principles that are not limited to one scientific field. In spirit, this dates 
back to, at least, von Bertalanffy’s general systems theory [von Bertalanffy 1968]. The 
diversity of ideas and applications has not necessarily been a problem for complexity 
science; on the contrary, it has encouraged many scientists of different backgrounds 
(including the authors of this paper) to try collaborating, despite the transdisciplinary 
language barriers. 4.
Game theory
Game theory is a mathematical modeling framework for situations where the state of 
an individual is jointly determined by the individual’s own decisions and the decisions 
of others (who all, typically, strive to maximize their own benefit) [Hofbauer Sigmund 
1998]. Vaccination against infectious diseases is a typical example. If everyone else were 
vaccinated, the rational choice would be to not get vaccinated. The disease could any-
way not spread in the population, whether or not you are vaccinated. Moreover, vac-
cines can, after all, have side effects, and injections are uncomfortable. If nobody were 
vaccinated, and the chance of getting the disease times the gravity of the consequences 
outweighs the above-mentioned inconveniences, then it would be rational to get vac-
cinated. This situation could, mathematically, be phrased as a minority game [Challet & 
al. 2005]. The emergent solution for a population of rational, well-informed and selfish 
individuals is that a fraction of the agents would get vaccinated and another fraction 
not. This example is, at the time of writing, the background to a controversy where peo-
ple getting vaccinated see people resisting vaccination as irresponsible to the society 
[Honigsbaum 2015].
Game theory has been an especially strong undercurrent in economy and popula-
tion biology. We note that a special feature of game theory, compared to similarly inter-
disciplinary theories, is that the various fields using it seem rather well informed about 
the other fields’ progress and not so many concepts have been reinvented. Game theory 
itself is not a framework for mechanistic models, and especially in population biology 
(where an individual usually represents a species or a sub-population) it is not clear that 
is its main use. Nevertheless, there are many mechanistic models in economy and popu-
lation biology that uses game theory as a fundamental ingredient [Rasmusen 1989].
Network theory
Just like complexity and game theory, network theory is a great place for information 
exchange between the natural and social sciences. Its basic idea is to use networks of 
vertices, connected pairwise by edges, as a systematic way of simplifying a system. By 
studying the network structure (roughly speaking, how a network differs from a random 
network) one can say something about how the system functions as a whole, or the roles 
of the individual vertices and edges in the system [Newman 2010, Barabási 2015]. The 
multidisciplinarity of network theory is reflected in its overlapping terminology—verti-
ces and edges are called nodes and links in computer science, sites and bonds in physics 
and chemistry, actors and ties in sociology, etc.
Many ideas in network theory originated in social science, and for that reason it may 
not fit in a section about influences from natural science. Nevertheless, as mentioned, 
it is a field where ideas frequently flow from the natural and formal sciences to social 
sciences. Centrality measures like PageRank and HITS were, for example, developed in 
computer science [Newman 2010], as were fundamental concepts of temporal network 
theory (where information about the time when vertices and edges are active is includ-
ed in the network) [Holme Saramäki 2012].
Early computer simulations to understand social mechanisms
In this section, we will go through some developments in the use of mechanistic models 
in social science. We will focus on early studies, assuming the readers largely know the 
current trends. This is by no means a review (which would need volumes of books), but 
a few snapshots highlighting some differences and similarities to today’s science in the 
methodologies and the questions asked.
Operations research
Just like the computer hardware, the research topics for simulation and mechanistic 
models have many roots in military efforts around the Second World War. Perhaps the 
main discipline for this type of research is operations research, which is usually clas-
sified as a branch of applied mathematics. The objective of operations research is to 
optimize the management of large-scale organizations—managing supply chains, 
scheduling crews of ships, planes and trains, etc. The military was not the only such 
organization that interested the early computer simulation researchers. Harling [1958] 
provides an overview of the state of computer simulations in operation research in the 
late 1950’s. As a typical example, Jennings and Dickins modeled the flow of people and 
buses in the Port Authority Bus Terminal in New York City during the morning rush 5.
hour [Jennings Dickins 1958]. They modeled the buses individually and passengers as 
numbers of exiting, not transferring, individuals. The authors tried to simultaneously 
optimize the interests of three actors—the bus operators, the passengers, and the Port 
Authority (operating the terminal). These objectives were mostly not conflicting—in 
principle it was better for all if the passenger throughput was as high as possible. A fur-
ther simplifying factor was that the station was the terminus for all buses. The challenge 
was that buses stopping to let off passengers could block other buses, thus creating a 
traffic jam. To solve this problem, the paper evaluated different methods to assign a bus 
stop to an incoming bus.
Political Science
Although rarely cited today, simulation studies of political decision processes were quite 
common in the 1950s and ‘60s. Crecine [1968] reviews some of these models. One differ-
ence from today is that these models were less abstract, often focusing on a particular 
political or juridical organization. The earliest paper we are aware of is Guetzkow’s 1959 
investigation of the use of computer simulations as a support system for international 
politics [Guetzkow 1959]. However, many studies in this field credit de Sola Pool & al.’s 
simulation of the American presidential elections 1960 and 1964 as the starting point 
[de Sola Pool & al. 1965]. In their work, the authors gathered a collection of 480 voter 
profiles that they could use to test different scenarios (with respect to what topics that 
would turn out to be important for the campaign). Eventually they predicted the out-
come of the elections with 82% accuracy.
In their Ph.D. theses, Cherryholmes [1966] and Shapiro [1966] modeled voting in 
the House of Representatives by: First, dividing members into classes with respect to 
how susceptible they were to influence. Second, modeling the influence process via an 
interaction network where people were more likely to communicate (and thus influence 
each other) if they were from the same party, state, committee, etc. Cherryholmes and 
Shapiro also validated their theories against actual voting behavior (something rarely 
seen in today’s simulation studies of opinion spreading [Castellano & al. 2009]). Other 
authors addressed more theoretical issues of voting systems, such as Arrow’s paradox 
[Klahr 1966, Tullock Campbell 1970] (which states, briefly speaking, that a perfect voting 
system is impossible for three or more alternatives).
There was also a considerable early interest in simulating decision making within 
an organization. Apparently the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was an important source of 
inspiration. De Sola Pool was, once again, a pioneer in this direction with a simulation 
of decision-making in a developing, general crisis with incomplete information [Kes-
sler De Sola Pool 1965]. Even more explicitly, Smith [1970] based his simulation on the 
personal accounts of the people involved in solving the Cuban missile crisis. Clema and 
Kirkham proposed yet a model of risks, costs and benefits in political conflicts [Clema 
Kirkham 1971]. Curiously, as late as 2007 there was a paper published on simulating the 
Cuban missile crisis [Stover 2007]. However, this paper explores mechanistic modeling 
as a method of teaching history, rather than the mechanisms of the decision making 
process itself.
Another type of political science research concerns the evolution of norms. A classic 
example is Axelrod’s 1986 paper [Axelrod 1986] where he investigated norms emerging 
as successful strategies in situations described by game theory. Axelrod let the norms 
evolve by genetic algorithms (an algorithmic framework for optimization inspired by 
genetics). In addition to norms, Axelrod also studied metanorms—norms that pro-
mote other norms (by e.g. encouraging punishing of people breaking or questioning the 
norms). Axelrod interpreted the results of the simulation in terms of established social 
mechanisms supporting the existence of norms (domination, internalization, deter-
rence, etc.).
Linguistics
In linguistics, the first computer simulation studies appeared in the mid-1960s. A typi-
cal early example is Klein [1966] who developed an individual-based simulation plat-
form for the evolution of language. Just like Cherryholmes and Shapiro (above), Klein 
assumed that the communication was not uniformly random between all pairs of in-
dividuals—spouses were more likely to speak to, and learn from, one another, as were 
parents and children. In multilingual societies, speakers were more likely to communi-
cate to another speaker of the same language (Klein allowed multilingual individuals). 6.
A language was represented by a set of explicit grammatical rules (with explicit word 
classes: nouns, verbs, etc.). Communication reinforced the grammatical rules between 
the speakers. Klein incremented the time by years and simulated several generations of 
speakers, but was not entirely happy with the results as communities tended to lose the 
diversity of their grammar quickly or diverge to mutually incomprehensible grammars. 
In retrospect, we feel like it was a still a great step forward, where the negative results 
helped raising important questions about what mechanisms that were missing. More 
modern models of language evolution have considered much simpler problems [Perfors 
2002]. One cannot help thinking that this is to avoid the complexities of reality, and 
more models in the vein of Klein’s 1966 paper would be more important. Later, Klein 
focused his research on more specific questions like the evolution of Tikopia and Maori 
[Klein & al. 1969]. The goal of these early simulation studies was to create something 
similar to a sociolinguistic fieldwork study. Thus these were proof-of-concept studies on 
a more concrete level than today’s more theoretically motivated research.
Geography
Demography and geography were also early fields to adopt computer simulations. One 
notable pioneer was the authors’ compatriot Torsten Hägerstrand whose Ph.D. thesis 
used computer simulations to investigate the diffusion of innovations [Hägerstrand 
1953]. His model was similar to two-dimensional disease-spreading models (but prob-
ably developed independently of computational epidemiology, where the first paper 
was published the year before [Abbey 1952]). Hägerstrand used an underlying square 
grid. People were spread out over the grid according to an empirically measured popu-
lation distribution. At each iteration of the simulation, there was a contact between 
two random individuals (where the chance of contact decayed with their separation). If 
the one of the individuals had adopted the innovation, and the other had not, then the 
latter would (with 100% probability) adopt it. A goal of Hägerstrand’s modeling was to 
recreate a “nebula shaped” distribution of the innovation (this is further developed in 
Hägerstrand [1965]). To this end, Hägerstrand introduced a concept (still in use) called 
“mean information field” representing the probability of getting the information (inno-
vation) from the source.
A technically similar topic to information diffusion is that of migration (as in moving 
one’s home). This research dates back to Ravenstein’s 1885 paper “The laws of migration” 
which is very mechanistically oriented [Ravenstein 1885]. He listed seven principles for 
human migration such as: short-distance migration is more common than long-dis-
tance; people who migrate far have a tendency to go to a “great centre of commerce or 
industry”. Computer simulation lends itself naturally to exploring the outcomes such 
mechanisms in terms of demographics. One such example is Porter’s migration model 
where agents were driven by the availability of work and the availability of work was 
partly driven by where people were. If there was an excess of workers, workers would 
move to the closest available job opportunity; if there was an excess of vacancies, the 
closest applicant would be offered the job [Porter 1956].
The study of human mobility (how people move around both in their everyday lives 
and extreme situations, such as disasters) is an active field of research. It has even 
been revitalized lately by the availability of new data sources (see e.g. Brockmann & al. 
[2006]). One common type of simulation study, involving human mobility data, aims at 
predicting outbreaks of epidemic diseases. To model potentially contagious contacts 
between people, one can use more or less realism. However, even for the most realistic 
and detailed simulations, there is a choice of using the real data to calibrate a model 
of human mobility [Eubank & al. 2004] or run the simulation on actual mobility data 
(perhaps with simulations to fill in missing data) [Balcan & al. 2009].
Economics and management science
There were many early computational studies in economics that used simulation tech-
niques for scenario testing [Cohen 1960, Birchmore 1970]. A typical question was to in-
vestigate the operations of a company at many levels (overlapping with the operations-
research section above). Evidently, the researchers saw a future where every aspect of 
running a business would be modeled—marketing, human resource development, so-
cial interaction within the company, the competition with other firms, adoption of new 
technologies, etc. To make progress, the authors needed to restrict themselves. Birch-
more [1970], for example, focused on forest firms. Much of his work revolved around a 7.
forestry firm’s interaction with its resource and the many game theoretical consider-
ations that arouse from the conflicting time perspectives of short- and long-time rev-
enues and the competition with other companies. Birchmore only used one or a few 
combinations of parameter values, rather than investigating the parameter dependence 
like modern game theory would do. Finally, we note that economics and management 
science were also early to address questions about validation and other epistemological 
aspects of computer simulations [Naylor Finger 1967].
Anthropology and demographics
Anthropology was also early to embrace simulation techniques, especially to problems 
relating to social structure, kinship and marriage [Coult Randolph 1965]. These are per-
haps the traditional problems of anthropology that has the most complex structure of 
causal explanations, and for that reason are most in need for proof-of-concept-type 
computer simulations. Gilbert and Hammel [1966], for example, addressed the ques-
tion: “How much, and in what ways, is the rate of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage 
influenced by the number of populations involved in the exchange of women, by their 
size, by their rules of postmarital residence, and by degree of territorially endogamic 
preference?” To answer these questions, the authors constructed a complex model 
including villages of explicit sizes, individuals of explicit gender, age and kinship, and 
rules for how to select a spouse. The model was described primarily in words, in much 
detail and length. A modern reader would think that pseudocode would make the paper 
more readable (and certainly much shorter). Probably the anthropology journals of the 
time were too conservative, or the programming literacy to low, for including pseudo-
code in the articles.
In a study similar to Gilbert and Hempel, one step closer to demographics, May and 
Heer [1968] used computer simulations to argue that the large family sizes in rural India 
(of that time) were rational choices for the individuals, rather than a consequence of 
ignorance and indecision. Around the same time, there were studies of more general 
questions of human demographics [Barrett 1969], highlighting a transition from mecha-
nistic models for scenario testing to proof-of-concept models and hypothesis discovery.
Cognitive and behavioral science
In cognitive science (sometimes bordering to behavioral science), researchers in the 
1960s were excited about the prospects of understanding human cognition as a com-
puter program. 
Abelson Carrol [1965], for example, proposed that mechanistic simulations could 
address questions like how a person can reach an understanding (“develop a belief sys-
tem”) of a complex situation in terms of a set of consistent descriptive clauses (encod-
ing, for example causal relationships). Several researchers proposed reverse engineer-
ing of human thinking into computer programs as a method to understand cognitive 
processes [Newell Simon 1961]. Some even went so far as to interpret dreams as an op-
erating system process [Newman Evans 1965]. These ideas were not without criticism. 
Frijda [1967] argued that there would always be technical aspects of computer code 
without a corresponding cognitive function. History seems to given the author right 
since few studies nowadays pursues replicating human thinking by procedural comput-
er programs. There were of course many other types of studies in this area. For example, 
early studies in computational neuroscience influenced the behavioral-science side of 
cognitive science [Green 1961].
Sociology
Simulation, in sociology, has always been linked to finding social mechanisms. Even 
before computer simulations, there were mathematical models for that purpose [Edling 
2002, Coleman 1964]. As an example of mathematical model building, we briefly men-
tion Nicholas Rashevsky and his program in “mathematical biophysics” at University of 
Chicago [Cull 2007, Abraham 2004]. Trained as a physicist, Rashevsky and his group pio-
neered the modeling of many social (and biological) phenomena such as social influence 
[Rashevsky 1949], how social group structure affect information flow [Rapoport 1953], 
and fundamental properties of social networks [Solomonoff Rapoport 1951]. However, 
Rashevsky and colleagues operated rather disconnected from the rest of academia—
mostly publishing in their Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics and often not building 
on empirical results available. Perhaps for this reason (even though his contemporaries 8.
were aware of his work [Karlsson 1958]) is Rashevsky & al.’s direct impact on today’s 
sociology rather limited.
Even though there were stochastic models in sociology in the early 1960’s (e.g. White 
[1962]), these were analyzed analytically and early sociological computer simulations 
were off to a rather late start. Coleman [1965] and Gullahorn and Gullahorn [1963] and 
[1965] gave the earliest discussions of the prospects of computer modeling in sociology 
that we are aware of. Coleman discussed both abstract questions about relating social 
action and social organization, and more concrete ones like using simulation to test 
social-contagion scenarios of smoking among adolescents. The Gullahorns were more 
interested in organization and conflict resolution, typically in the interface of sociology 
and behavioral science. McGinnis [1968] presented a stochastic model of social mobil-
ity that he analyzed both analytically and by simulations. “Mobility”, in McGinnis work, 
should be read in an extremely general sense, indicating change of an individual’s posi-
tion in any sociometric observable (including physical space).
Markley’s 1967 paper on the SIVA model is another early simulation study of a classic 
sociological problem [Markley 1967], namely what kind of pairwise relationships that 
could build up a stable organization. The letters SIVA stands for four aspects of such 
relationships in an organization facing some situation that could require some action 
to be taken—Strength (the ratio of how important the two individuals are to the orga-
nization), Influence (describing how strongly they influence each other), Volitional (the 
relative will to act with respect to the situation) and Action (quantifying the joint result 
of the two actors). These different aspects are coupled and Markley used computer sim-
ulations to find fixed points of the dynamics. For many parameter values, it turned out 
that the SIVA values diverged or fluctuated—which Markley took as an indication that 
one would not observe such combinations of parameter values in real organizations.
A model touching classical sociological ground that recently has received excep-
tional amounts of attention is Schelling’s segregation model [Schelling 1969]. With 
this model, Schelling argued that a strong racial segregation (with the United States in 
mind) does not necessarily mean that people have very strong opinions about the race 
of their neighbors. Briefly, Schelling spread individuals of two races on a square grid. 
Some sites were left vacant. Then he picked an individual at random. If this individual 
had a lower ratio of neighbors of the same race than a threshold value, then he or she 
moved to a vacant site. It turned out that the segregation (measured as the fraction 
of links between people of the same race) would always move away from threshold as 
the iterations converged. Segregation, Schelling concluded, could thus occur without 
people actively avoiding different races (they just needed to seek similar neighbors), and 
spatial effects would make a naïve interpretation of the observed mixing overestimating 
the actual sentiments of the people. The core question—what are the weakest require-
ments (of tolerance to your neighbors ethnicity) for something (racial segregation) to 
happen—was a hallmark of Schelling’s research and probably an approach that could 
be fruitful for future studies. We highly recommend Schelling’s popular science book 
Micromotives and Macrobehavior [Schelling 1978] as a bridge between the methodolo-
gies of natural and social science.
Discussion and conclusions
The motivation for the use of mechanistic models in social science is often to use them 
as proof-of concept models. “[I]t forces one to be specific about the variables in interper-
sonal behavior and the exact relation between them” [Hare 1961, Gullahorn Gullahorn 
1963, Hartman Walsh 1969]. The way computer programming forces the researchers to 
break down the social phenomena into algorithmic blocks helps identifying mecha-
nisms [Dutton Briggs 1971, Gullahorn Gullahorn 1963]. Other authors point out that 
with computational methods, the researchers can avoid oversimplifying the problem 
[De Sola Pool & al. 1965]. Another point of view is that simulation in social sciences is 
primarily for exploring poorly understood situations and phenomena as a replacement 
for an actual (in practice impossible to carry out) experiment [Simon 1969, Fleisher 1965, 
Naylor & al. 1969, Crecine 1968]. Such models are obviously closest to hypothesis gen-
erators in our above classification. Crane [1962] and Ostrom [1988] think of computer 
simulations that, alongside natural languages and mathematics, could describe social 
sciences. Going a bit off topic, other authors went so far as to using, or recommending to 
use, computer programs as representations of human cognitive processes [Colby 1967, 
Newell Simon 1961, Newman Evans 1965]. 9.
The history of computational studies in social science—as illustrated by our exam-
ples—has seen a gradual shift of focus. In the early days, it was, as mentioned, often 
regarded as a replacement for empirical studies. Such mechanistic models for scenario 
testing still exists in both natural and social science. However, nowadays it is much 
more common to use computational methods in theory building—either one uses it 
to test the completeness of a theoretical framework (proof-of-concept modeling), or to 
explore the space of possible mechanisms or outcomes (hypothesis discovery).
It is quite remarkable how similar this development has been in the natural and 
social sciences. At least since mid-1950s, it is hard to say that one side leads the way. 
This is reflected in how the information flows between disciplines. Looking at the inter-
disciplinary citation patterns [Rosvall Bergstrom 2011] found that out of 203,900 cita-
tions from social science journals, 33,891 were to natural science journals, and out of 
10,080,078 citations from natural science journals 35,199 were to social science journals. 
If citations were random, without any within-field bias there would be around 201,000 
interdisciplinary citations in both directions, which is 5.9 times the number of social 
science citations to natural science and 5.7 times the number of natural science cita-
tions to social science. In this view, there is almost no inherent asymmetry in the infor-
mation flow between the areas, only an asymmetry induced by the size difference.
Even though social scientists do not need to collaborate with natural scientists to 
develop mechanistic modeling, we do encourage collaboration. The usefulness of in-
terdisciplinary collaborations comes from the details of the scientific work. It can help 
people to see their object system with new eyes. One discipline may, for example, care 
about the extreme and need input from another to see interesting aspects of the average 
(cf. phase transitions in the complexity of algorithms [Moore Mertens 2011]). Interdisci-
plinary information flow could help a discipline overcome technical difficulties. The use 
of MCMC techniques in the social sciences may be a good example of this. It is, however, 
important that such developments come from a need to understand the world around 
us and not just because they have not been done before.
A major trend at the time of writing is “big data” and “data science”. This essay has 
intentionally focused on the other side of computational social science—mechanistic 
models. In practice, these two sides can (and do) influence each other. If it cannot pre-
dict real systems at all, a mechanistic model is quite worthless in providing a causal 
explanation [Watts 2014, Hindman 2015]. Modern, large-scale data sets provide plenty 
opportunities to validate models [Lazer & al. 2009, Holme Huss 2011, Pentland 2014]. 
Another use of big data is in hybrid approaches where one combines a simulation and 
an empirical dataset, for example simulations of disease spreading on temporal net-
works of human contacts [Holme Saramäki 2012].
As a concluding remark, we want to express our support for social scientists inter-
ested in exploring the methods of natural science and natural scientists seeking ap-
plications for their methods in the social sciences. To be successful and make most out 
of such a step, we recommend the social scientist to spend a month to learn a general 
programming language (Python, Matlab, C, etc.). There is not shortcut (like an inte-
grated modeling environment) to learning the computational subtleties and trade-offs 
of building a simulation model, and simulation papers often do not mention them. 
Furthermore, if a social scientist leaves this aspect to a natural scientist, then she also 
leaves parts of the social modeling to the natural scientist—collaboration simply works 
better if the computational fundamentals need not be discussed. To the theoretical 
natural scientists that are used to simulations, we recommend spending a month read-
ing popular social science books (e.g. [Watts 2012, Simon 1969, Schelling 1978]). There 
are too many examples of natural scientists going into social science with the ambition 
to use the same methods as they are used to—only replacing the natural components 
by social—and ending up with results that are unverifiable, too general to be interest-
ing, infeasible or already known. While reading, we encourage meditating the following 
question—why do social scientists ask different questions about society than natural 
scientists do about nature?
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